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Abstract
The problem of secure two-party vector dominance re-
quires the comparison of two vectors in an “all-or-nothing”
way. In this paper we provide a solution to this problem
based on the semi-honest model. It is reduced to the prob-
lem of privacy preserving preﬁx test, and an additive thresh-
old homomorphic encryption is used to protect those priva-
cies while computing the results of all of the preﬁx tests.
Our solution has advantages of efﬁciency and security in
comparison with other solutions.
Keywords : vector dominance, secure multiparty com-
putation, homomorphic encryption.
1 Introduction
Let A = (a1, a2, ..., an) and B = (b1, b2, ..., bn) be two
vectors. We say A dominates B (denoted by A  B), if





i (1 ≤ i
′ ≤ n), A does not dominate B.
The problem of Secure Two-party Vector Dominance
(STVD) was ﬁrstly deﬁned in [1]: Alice (the owner of
vector A) and Bob (the owner of vector B) want to know
whether A  B in an “all-or-nothing” way. “All-or-
nothing” means that they should know whether A  B
or not while the following security requirements are met:
1) neither Alice nor Bob knows any element of the other’s
vector; 2)neither Alice nor Bob knows the relative ordering
of any element pair (ai, bi) (i.e., whether some ai ≤ bi or
not). STVD can be looked as a multi-dimensional extension
from Yao’s millionaire problem [15], in which two million-
aires want to know whose number of money is greater than
the other’s, without disclosing their numbers to each other.
STVD can be encountered in many applications [5], e.g.,
multi-commodity private bidding. In business-to-business
bidding, a manufacturer may only want to deal with the sup-
plier that can simultaneously satisfy the requirement for n
items because they have some coordinations in the produc-
tion. This can be treated as a STVD problem: Alice want to
buy n items from Bob if she can securely know her bidding
vectorA dominates Bob’s price vectorB without disclosing
anything other than whether they can have a deal.
In this paper we use 0-encoding to reduce STVD to a few
cases of the Preﬁx Testing problem. The whole protocol of
STVD is constructed on an additive homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme, Paillier’s cryptosystem. Our protocol com-
pares favorably in both efﬁciency and security with other
solutions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Some related work is discussed in section 2. The prelim-
inaries of our protocol are given in section 3. The building
blocks are constructed in section 4, and our protocol is de-
scribed in details in section 5. Comparisons of our protocol
with other two solutions are given in section 6, and the pa-
per is concluded in section 7.
2 Related Work
The problem of STVD is a special case of the general
Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) problem. Generally
speaking, a SMC problem deals with computing any proba-
bilistic function on any input, in a distributed network where
each participant holds one of the inputs, ensuring indepen-
dence of the inputs, correctness of the computation, and that
no more information is revealed to a participant in the com-
putation than can be computed from that participant’s in-
put and output [10]. As Goldreich states in [9], the general
secure multi-party computation problem is solvable in the-
ory, but it’s impractical to use the solutions derived by these
general results for special cases of multi-party computation;
special solutions should be developed for the problem of
STVD for efﬁciency reasons.
There have been many protocols for the millionaire prob-
lem ([2],[7],[11],[12],[14],[15]). In [12] a very efﬁcient
protocol for this problem is proposed using a technique sim-
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ilar with the 0-encoding in this paper. However, it’s not suit-
able to run their protocol n rounds to check whetherA  B,
otherwise the ordering of every pair (ai, bi) will be known
by Alice and Bob. A more secure protocol should be devel-
oped.
Till now, there have been a few protocols for STVD. The
protocol in [1] use a third party, and the third party is as-
sumed not to collude with either Alice or Bob, otherwise
the honest party will be cheated by the two colluders. To
improve the security, the protocol in [5] doesn’t employ the
third party and is based on Yao’s protocol for millionaire
problem. In [5] Alice and Bob are assumed to be semi-
honest. However, the complexity of Yao’s protocol ([15])
depends on the range of the input, i.e., for inputs of k-bit
numbers the complexity is O(2k). All of these protocols
assumes that the inputs are non-negative integers. In this
paper we keep on such an assumption.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Semi-honest Model
In this paper we assume that Alice and Bob are semi-
honest to each other. A formal deﬁnitions of semi-honest
model can be found in [9]. A semi-honest party is assumed
to follow the protocol exactly as what is prescribed by the
protocol, except that it keeps a record of all its intermediate
computations. Security in this model means that no player
or coalition of players gains information which is not inher-
ent in the output of the calculated function.
Semi-honest parties do constitute a model of indepen-
dent interest ([9]). Because deviation from the speciﬁed
program is difﬁcult in many settings, general malicious be-
haviors, e.g., aborting the protocol or entering the protocol
with an arbitrary input, may be infeasible for many users.
However, it’s easier to record the contents of some registers
by the standard activities of the operating system, so some
semi-honest behaviors may be feasible for the users: they
may analyze their records of all intermediate computations
so as to get any information other than the output.
3.2 Homomorphic Encryption
Our construction of STVD protocol is based on a Ho-
momorphic Encryption (HE) scheme. A general deﬁnition
of HE is given as follows [4]. Let ε be a probabilistic en-
cryption scheme. Let M be the message space and C the
ciphertext space such that M is a group under operation
⊕ and C is a group under operation ⊗. ε is a (⊕,⊗)-HE
scheme if for any instance E of the encryption scheme,
given c1 = Er1(m1) and c2 = Er2(m2), there exists an
r such that
c1 ⊗ c2 = Er1(m1)⊗ Er2(m2) = Er(m1 ⊕m2)
ε is additive when it’s a (+,⊗) scheme, and multiplica-
tive when it’s a (∗,⊗) scheme.
The HE scheme are also required to support secure
(2, 2)-threshold decryption in our construction. The cor-
responding secret key is shared by both parties, and the
decryption can only be performed by all parties acting to-
gether, but can’t be performed by any single party.
There are a few cryptosystems that satisfy our require-
ments, and for efﬁciency we employ ElGamal encryption
([6]). We use a (2, 2)-threshold variant of ElGamal encryp-
tion ([4]) which is depicted as follows:
- Distributed Key Generation: Let p and q be large
primes such that p = 2q + 1. Gq denotes Z∗p’s unique
multiplicative subgroup of order q, and Gq has a gen-
erator of g. Alice’s share of secret key is a random
sA ∈ Zq and Bob’s share of secret key is a random
sB ∈ Zq . Alice and Bob publish gsA and gsB respec-
tively. The common public key is (g, h, f) for which
h = gsA+sB , f ∈ Gq .
- Encryption: given a message m ∈ Zq , E(m) =
(x, y) = (gα, hαfm) in which α is an random num-
ber in Zq .
- Decryption: given a ciphertext c = (x, y), Alice
and Bob publishes xsA and xsB respectively, D(c) =
y/xsA+sB .
In the above scheme, D(c) = fm, but in this paper we
only care about whether m = 0, i.e., whether D(c) = 1.
The scheme has the following properties: 1) given two en-
cryptions E(m1) = (x1, y1) and E(m2) = (x2, y2), we
can efﬁciently get E(m1 + m2) = (x1x2, y1y2); 2)given
an encryption E(m) = (x, y) and a number a, we can efﬁ-
ciently get E(am) = (xa, ya).
4 Building Blocks
4.1 0-encoding
Suppose that Alice has a binary string aI ...a2a1 ∈
{0, 1}I for a, Bob has a binary string bJ ...b2b1 ∈ {0, 1}J
for b. a, b ∈ {0, ..., 2K+1 − 1}. K is a security parameter
for Alice and Bob so that 2K+1 won’t leak any information
about the range of their bit strings. We respectively add the
preﬁx of ‘0..0′ with length of K − I and K − J to a and b
to have a K-bit a and b.
If a > b, there must be a i (1 ≤ i ≤ K), which satisﬁes
aK ...ai+1 = bK ...bi+1, ai = 1, and bi = 0. If such a bi
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is substituted by 1, then bK ...bi+11 = aK ...ai+1ai. This is
the main idea of 0-encoding on b, which is ﬁrstly shaped in
[12]. In this section we describe it in a more general way
and elicit more detailed properties: 1)0-encoding on b has at
most one preﬁx of a; 2)0-encoding on b has only one preﬁx
of a iff b < a.
For a n-bit integer number b whose binary string is
bnbn−1...b1 ∈ {0, 1}n, the 0-encoding of b is the set of S0b
such that
S0b = {1|bn = 0}∪{bnbn−1...bi+11|bi = 0, n−1 ≥ i ≥ 1}
For example, given b = (0101)2, S0b = {1, 011}.
Property 1: given two K-bit numbers a and b, S0b has a
preﬁx of a, iff a > b.
Proof : If a > b, there must be a J for which
aK ...aJ+1 = bK ...bJ+1, aJ = 1 and bJ = 0, so
bK ...bJ+11 ∈ S0b and bK ...bJ+11 is a preﬁx of a. On
the contrary, if S0b has a preﬁx of a, e.g., bK ...bJ ′1 =
aK ...aJ′aJ′−1, then bK ...bJ′ = aK ...aJ ′ , bJ′−1 = 0, and
aJ ′−1 = 1. So a must be larger than b. 
Property 2: given two K-bit numbers a and b, S0b has at
most one preﬁx of a.
Proof. From property 1 S0b has a preﬁx of a when a > b.
Suppose that S0b have two preﬁxes of a, such as:
aK ...ai+1ai = bK ...bi+11 (1)
aK ...aiai−1...aj−1aj = bK ...bibi−1...bj−11 (2)
From (1) we can have ai = 1, bi = 0; However, in (2)
it’s obvious that ai = bi, which contradicts ai 	= bi in (1).
Therefore, S0b can’t have two preﬁxes of a. It can also be
induced that S0b can’t have more than two preﬁxes of a. 
Property 3: given two K-bit numbers a and b, S0b hasn’t a
preﬁx of a, iff a ≤ b.
Property 3 can be easily deduced from property 1 and 2.
4.2 Privacy Preserving Preﬁx Test
By property 1, whether S0bi has a preﬁx of ai is a basic
problem of STVD.
Suppose that the binary string of ai is aiK ...ai1 ∈
{0, 1}K , bi is biK ...bi1 ∈ {0, 1}K , and S0bi = {bji |1 ≤
j ≤ Ki,Ki ∈ [1,K]}, |bji | = Jij (Jij ∈ [1,K]) and
bji = b[i, j, Jij ]b[i, j, Jij − 1]...b[i, j, 1] ∈ {0, 1}Jij . We
also suppose that a
′
i is the longest preﬁx of ai which ends
up with ‘1′, and |a′i| = Ji (Ji ∈ [1,K]).
If Alice and Bob want to test whether bji is a preﬁx of ai
while preserving their privacies on ai and b
j
i , they can fol-
low the protocol of Privacy Preserving Preﬁx Test (PPPT):
1. Randomly choosing r[i, l, 0] and r[i, l, 1] from Zq , Al-
ice gets the following 2 × K encryption matrix Zi
based on ai:
Zi =(
z[i,K, 0] ... z[i, Ji, 0] z[i, Ji − 1, 0] ... z[i, 1, 0]
z[i,K, 1] ... z[i, Ji, 1] z[i, Ji − 1, 1] ... z[i, 1, 1]
)
(a) if K ≥ l ≥ Ji and ail = 0, z[i, l, 0] = E(0),
z[i, l, 1] = E(r[i, l, 1]).
(b) if K ≥ l ≥ Ji and ail = 1, z[i, l, 0] =
E(r[i, l, 0]), z[i, l, 1] = E(0).
(c) if (Ji − 1) ≥ l ≥ 1, z[i, l, 0] = E(r[i, l, 0]),
z[1, l, 1] = E(r[i, l, 1]).
Alice sends Zi to Bob.
2. Based on bji and Zi, Bob gets yij as following:
yij =z[i,K, b[i, j, Jij ]] · z[i,K − 1, b[i, j, Jij − 1]]
· · · z[i,K − Jij + 1, b[i, j, 1]] · E(0)
Bob sends yij to Alice.
3. Alice decrypts yij . If D(yij) = 1, then b
j
i is a preﬁx
of ai; otherwise it’s not a preﬁx of ai.
Theorem 1 With overwhelming probability, PPPT is com-
plete (if bji is a preﬁx of ai, D(yij) = 1) and sound (if b
j
i
isn’t a preﬁx of ai, D(yij) 	= 1).
Proof: If bji is a preﬁx of ai, then z[i,K, b[i, j, Jij ]] =
z[i,K − 1, b[i, j, Jij − 1]] = ... = z[i,K − Jij +
1, b[i, j, 1]] = E(0), and D(yij) = 1 due to the homomor-
phic encryption.
If bji isn’t a preﬁx of ai, yij = E(Rij). Rij is a random
number in Zq , and with negligible probability Rij is 0 or
the order of f . Therefore, with overwhelming probability
D(yij) 	= 1. 
5 The Protocol
From property 1 and 2, A  B if and only if ev-
ery S0bi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) has a unique preﬁx of the corre-
sponding ai. Therefore the main idea of our protocol for
STVD is: 1)on every bji in S
0
bi
for 1 ≤ j ≤ Ki, PPPT









j=1 Rij) is got. If there is
a Rij = 0 for all S0bi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), then D(Y ) = 1.
Protocol : The protocol for Secure Two-party Vector
Dominance problem
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Input : Two players, Alice and Bob, don’t trust in each
other. Alice has a private vector A = (a1, a2, ..., an) and
Bob has a private vector B = (b1, b2, ..., bn).
Output : The two players know whether A  B, with-
out disclosing their vectors to each other or the ordering of
any pair (ai, bi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Step 1Alice and Bob generate the public key and secret
key following with the threshold cryptosystem in section
3.2. Every party holds the public key and it’s own share of
the secret key.
Step 2 Bob generates his S0bi for i = 1, ..., n, as de-
scribed in section 4.1.
Step 3 For j = 1, 2, ...,K,
1. based on a1, Alice gets an 2 × K encryption matrix
Z1,j as following:
Z1,j =(
z[1,K, 0] ... z[1, J1, 0]
z[1,K, 1] ... z[1, J1, 1]
z[1, J1 − 1, 0] ... z[1, 1, 0]
z[1, J1 − 1, 1] ... z[1, 1, 1]
)
The pairs of (z[1, l, 0], z[1, l, 1]) are valued as follow-
ing, with r0il and r
1
il randomly chosen from Zq for ev-
ery iteration of j:
1.1 if j = 1,
i. if K ≥ l ≥ J1 and a1l = 0, z[1, l, 0] =
E(0), z[1, l, 1] = E(r11l).
ii. if K ≥ l ≥ J1 and a1l = 1, z[1, l, 0] =
E(r01l), z[1, l, 1] = E(0).
iii. if (J1 − 1) ≥ l ≥ 1, z[1, l, 0] = E(r01l),
z[1, l, 1] = E(r11l).
1.2 if j = 2, ...,K, with y1,j−1 from Bob,
i. if K ≥ l ≥ J1 and a1l = 0, z[1, l, 0] =
(y1,j−1)0 · E(0), z[1, l, 1] = (y1,j−1)r11l .
ii. if K ≥ l ≥ J1 and a1l = 1, z[1, l, 0] =
(y1,j−1)r
0
1l , z[1, l, 1] = (y1,j−1)0 · E(0).
iii. if (J1 − 1) ≥ l ≥ 1, z[1, l, 0] = (y1,j−1)r01l ,
z[1, l, 1] = (y1,j−1)r
1
1l .
2. Alice sends Z1,j to Bob.
3. In every pair of (z[1, l, 0], z[1, l, 1]) for l = 1, ..., J1j ,
Bob selects z[1, l, b] if b[1, j, l] = b (b ∈ {0, 1}), and
gets y1,j as following:
3.1 if 1 ≤ j ≤ Ki,
y1,j =
z[1,K, b[1, 1, J1j ]] · z[1,K − 1, b[1, 1, J1j − 1]]
· · · z[1,K − J1j + 1, b[1, 1, 1]] · E(0)
3.2 if (Ki + 1) ≤ j ≤ K, y1,j = (y1,j−1)rj , rj is
randomly chosen from Zn.
4. Bob sends y1,j to Alice.
Step 4 For i = 2, ..., n, based on ai and bi,j (j =
1, ...,K), Alice and Bob repeat step 3.
Step 5 Alice and Bob get Y = y1,K · y2,K · · · yn,K .
Step 6 Alice and Bob combine their shares of the secret
key, and then decrypt Y . If D(Y ) = 1, A  B; otherwise
A doesn’t dominate B.
Theorem 2 With overwhelming probability, the protocol
for STVD is complete (if A  B, D(Y ) = 1) and sound
(if A doesn’t dominate B, D(Y ) 	= 1).
Proof: If A  B, every S0bi has a preﬁx of ai. In step 3,
actually every bj1 could have selected elements from Z1,1
on every 2 ≤ j ≤ Ki without adapting Z1,1 to Z1,j , and





1 that is the preﬁx
of a1, then R1,j′ = 0. However, to keep the privacy of B,
Z1,1 is changed into Z1,j for 2 ≤ j ≤ Ki, and K rounds
are used to get the encrypted multiplication of R1,j : y1,K =
E(R1,1 ·R1,2 · · ·R1,K). It’s still be true that y1,K = E(0) if





If every S0bi has a preﬁx of ai, Y = E(0) and D(Y ) = 1.
If A doesn’t dominate B, i.e., there is at least one S0bi′
that hasn’t a preﬁx of ai′ . From theorem 1, with over-
whelming probability E(Ri′,j) 	= E(0) for j = 1, ...,K,
and yi′,K = E(
∏K
j=1 Ri′,j) 	= E(0). Therefore, in step 5,
overwhelmingly Y 	= E(0) and D(Y ) 	= 1.
Theorem 3 The protocol for STVD is secure for Alice and
Bob when they are semi-honest parties.
Proof:The security of STVD for semi-honest parties is
based on the security of ElGamal’s cryptosystem. At ev-
ery step, what Alice and Bob get are all encryptions, and in
the ﬁnal step only Y is decrypted. If Y 	= E(0), D(Y ) is
a random number in Zq, so both of two parties can learn no
more information than A doesn’t dominate B.
6 Comparisons with other solutions
Suppose that K is the security parameter, n is the order
of A and B, the communication complexity of our proto-
col isO(nK2), and the computation complexity isO(nK2)
modular multiplications for Alice and O(nK) for Bob.
The solution in [5] has a O(nK) communication com-
plexity and O(nK) computation complexity, but a third
party is used in this protocol. To improve security, the solu-
tion in [1] doesn’t use a third party but has a O(n2k) com-
munication complexity and O(n2k) computation complex-
ity. Our protocol achieves much lower complexity while
keeping the stronger security.
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7 Conclusions
We have provided an efﬁcient and secure protocol for the
problem of secure two-party vector dominance. The prob-
lem is reduced to the problem of privacy preserving preﬁx
test. Homomorphic encryption is used to protect those pri-
vacies while computing the result of all of the preﬁx tests.
We leave as an open problem to achieve high efﬁciency in
the malicious model for STVD.
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